Re: DriveCrypt

Re: DriveCrypt

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Subject Author Date
Re: DriveCrypt anonymous 11-26-2008
Posted by nemo_outis on November 28, 2008, 1:37 pm
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> Your position and mine are about the same.


Not quite.

I speak of how open source is not a panacea. Of how the *potential* of
open source for thorough review and testing is almost never *realized* -
especially for crypto programs. Of how bugs *may* be exploited and how
backdoors *might* be inserted and remain undetected in open-source code.
Of what the NSA and other adversaries *may* be doing.

But for many of the same reasons that support the *possiblity* of the NSA
doing such things, I can draw no conclusion whether (and/or to what
extent) they are *really* doing so. That would be speculation and
surmise.

However, depending on their threat model and risk and consequence
analysis, some parties *may* choose to base their precautions on
scenarios approaching such worst-case possibilities.

Regards,

PS The resources and capabilities of the NSA (and such), great as they
are, are limited and finite. I suspect (but, for obvious reasons, do not
know) that the NSA is very selective in which programs it compromises.
For instance, Windows would be extremely attractive because of its
ubiquity, and also because mechanisms like frequent updates provide
attractive paths for ongoing compromise in the face of new
opportunities/threats. Moreover Windows provides an avenue to compromise
any program run under it, including completely "clean" crypto programs.

Compromising all the many crypto programs out there individually would be
very difficult, even for the NSA (unless, say, AES has a flaw). So many
contacts with crypto companies/organizations would, for instance, carry a
high risk of disclosure.

However, putting out one "ostensibly very good" program cheap or free for
subsequent widespread adoption could easily be done by the NSA.
Truecrypt could, for example, be such a program. (I emphasize "could" -
I have absolutely no substantive evidence for this being true.)



Posted by Ari on November 28, 2008, 7:31 pm
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On Fri, 28 Nov 2008 18:37:32 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:

> The resources and capabilities of the NSA (and such), great as they
> are, are limited and finite. I suspect (but, for obvious reasons, do not
> know) that the NSA is very selective in which programs it compromises.

So you don't think have my pink/baby blue tray icon "You're USB stick is
deep inside my 2.0 slot" notification tool is compromised?

> For instance, Windows would be extremely attractive because of its
> ubiquity, and also because mechanisms like frequent updates provide
> attractive paths for ongoing compromise in the face of new
> opportunities/threats. Moreover Windows provides an avenue to compromise
> any program run under it, including completely "clean" crypto programs.

I assume it is.

> Compromising all the many crypto programs out there individually would be
> very difficult, even for the NSA (unless, say, AES has a flaw). So many
> contacts with crypto companies/organizations would, for instance, carry a
> high risk of disclosure.

They could compromise four or five packages and get both wide
international results or one package which dominates an important
software/business sector. E.g. PROMIS

http://tr.im/1m3v

nemo, you know geographically that is my ole stompin' grounds.

> However, putting out one "ostensibly very good" program cheap or free for
> subsequent widespread adoption could easily be done by the NSA.
> Truecrypt could, for example, be such a program. (I emphasize "could" -
> I have absolutely no substantive evidence for this being true.)

How about Unix/Linux?
--
Meet Ari!
http://tr.im/1fa3

Posted by nemo_outis on November 28, 2008, 1:48 pm
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> An interesting read. Scary too. Maybe I'll go back to OTP, using my
> caesium decay for the RN source. Tedious, but no back doors and no
> sneaky code. Unless god works for the NSA.

Even OTP won't save you if your computer OS has been compromised.

As for crypto guarantees, I wouldn't accept one from God Himself except
maybe if I also had a non-compete agreement signed by the Devil :-)

Regards,



Posted by anonymous on November 28, 2008, 4:15 pm
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>
>> An interesting read. Scary too. Maybe I'll go back to OTP, using my
>> caesium decay for the RN source. Tedious, but no back doors and no
>> sneaky code. Unless god works for the NSA.
>
> Even OTP won't save you if your computer OS has been compromised.
>
> As for crypto guarantees, I wouldn't accept one from God Himself except
> maybe if I also had a non-compete agreement signed by the Devil :-)
>
> Regards,

Then you truly would have deceived yourself, making any agreement
with
the devil.



Posted by nemo_outis on November 28, 2008, 5:02 pm
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> Then you truly would have deceived yourself, making any agreement
> with the devil.


My transactions with the Devil have been eminently satisfactory, those with
God considerably more problematic :-)

Regards,

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