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Posted by Ari on November 28, 2008, 7:31 pm
If you were Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options On Fri, 28 Nov 2008 18:37:32 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:
> The resources and capabilities of the NSA (and such), great as they
> are, are limited and finite. I suspect (but, for obvious reasons, do not
> know) that the NSA is very selective in which programs it compromises.
So you don't think have my pink/baby blue tray icon "You're USB stick is
deep inside my 2.0 slot" notification tool is compromised?
> For instance, Windows would be extremely attractive because of its
> ubiquity, and also because mechanisms like frequent updates provide
> attractive paths for ongoing compromise in the face of new
> opportunities/threats. Moreover Windows provides an avenue to compromise
> any program run under it, including completely "clean" crypto programs.
I assume it is.
> Compromising all the many crypto programs out there individually would be
> very difficult, even for the NSA (unless, say, AES has a flaw). So many
> contacts with crypto companies/organizations would, for instance, carry a
> high risk of disclosure.
They could compromise four or five packages and get both wide
international results or one package which dominates an important
software/business sector. E.g. PROMIS
http://tr.im/1m3v
nemo, you know geographically that is my ole stompin' grounds.
> However, putting out one "ostensibly very good" program cheap or free for
> subsequent widespread adoption could easily be done by the NSA.
> Truecrypt could, for example, be such a program. (I emphasize "could" -
> I have absolutely no substantive evidence for this being true.)
How about Unix/Linux?
--
Meet Ari!
http://tr.im/1fa3
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