Warning: iconv_mime_decode() [function.iconv-mime-decode]: Malformed string in /home/secureg/public_html/lib/standard.lib.php on line 2251

Warning: iconv_mime_decode() [function.iconv-mime-decode]: Malformed string in /home/secureg/public_html/lib/standard.lib.php on line 2251

Warning: iconv_mime_decode() [function.iconv-mime-decode]: Malformed string in /home/secureg/public_html/lib/standard.lib.php on line 2251

Warning: iconv_mime_decode() [function.iconv-mime-decode]: Malformed string in /home/secureg/public_html/lib/standard.lib.php on line 2251

Warning: iconv_mime_decode() [function.iconv-mime-decode]: Malformed string in /home/secureg/public_html/lib/standard.lib.php on line 2251
Windows Vista and TPM Services
Windows Vista and TPM Services

Windows Vista and TPM Services

Secure Home | Search | About
 Microsoft Applications Security    Post an article   get this group's latest topics as an RSS feed add this group's latest topics to your My MSN content add this group's latest topics to your My Yahoo content add this group's latest topics to your Google content
Subject Author Date
Windows Vista and TPM Services Matty 12-29-2006
Posted by Matty on December 29, 2006, 5:06 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
Hi there all, I am working on a document on Windows Vista TPM Services,
and I have several questions I'm hoping someone can answer as well as
several thoughts I'd like some feedback on. Feel free to address any
combination of my comments/points, but I ask that you please try to be
informative and thoughtful in your reply- I'd like to really learn
something after all ;-)
1) Is the Endorsement Key used to create the hashes of integrity
monitoring/reporting metrics? If not, what key is used?

2) The TBB of a trusted platform is the TPM and the CRTM. The CRTM is
either a portion of or the entire BIOS code. Both of these components
must be trusted, and updates must be controlled. However, currently
3rd party BIOSes are prevalent, and anyone can update them. If this
situation does not change then basically 1 of the 2 components of the
TBB cannot really be trusted. How can we really ever have a trusted
computing platform if one of the 2 TBBs can be compromised? Perhaps
this issue is being addressed when I read the phrase "TPM-compliant
BIOS."

3) A trusted computing platform using a 1.2 TPM, and Windows Vista can
enable Secure Startup and BitLocker drive encryption to secure data
cryptographically. If the drive from this trusted computing platform
is stolen and placed into another system running another operating
system then what is the attacker missing in order to access the data?
The same thing they were missing before the trusted computing platform
was around- the encryption key. Therefore, doesn't the attacker
still have the same methods of brute force attack at their disposal for
cracking the encryption of the volume? How does the TPM make this
different once the drive has been removed from the system?

4) I am trying to write scripts to perform basic TPM management tasks.
Microsoft has some documentation on the WIn32_Tpm class which is
supposed to be used for this sort of thing, but I have not had any
success getting scripts to work on my Windows Vista 32-bit or 64-bit
installations. In the end I simply tried to search for the Win32_Tpm,
and could not even find it. The method for searching for the class was
to use the script below, and then pipe it to | findstr /I "Win32_Tpm".

=======================================
strComputer = "."
strNamespace = "\root"

Set objSWbemServices = GetObject("winmgmts:\" & strComputer &
strNamespace)

Set colClasses = objSWbemServices.SubClassesOf()
For Each objClass in colClasses
Wscript.Echo objClass.Path_.Path
Next
=======================================

I have some more questions floating around somewhere, but this is a
good start.

Thanks in advance for your replies.

Matt


Posted by PA Bear on December 29, 2006, 8:26 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
Forwarded to microsoft.public.windows.vista.security newsgroup via
crosspost.
--
~Robear Dyer (PA Bear)
MS MVP-Windows (IE, OE, Security, Shell/User)

Matty wrote:
> Hi there all, I am working on a document on Windows Vista TPM Services,
> and I have several questions I'm hoping someone can answer as well as
> several thoughts I'd like some feedback on. Feel free to address any
> combination of my comments/points, but I ask that you please try to be
> informative and thoughtful in your reply- I'd like to really learn
> something after all ;-)
> 1) Is the Endorsement Key used to create the hashes of integrity
> monitoring/reporting metrics? If not, what key is used?
>
> 2) The TBB of a trusted platform is the TPM and the CRTM. The CRTM is
> either a portion of or the entire BIOS code. Both of these components
> must be trusted, and updates must be controlled. However, currently
> 3rd party BIOSes are prevalent, and anyone can update them. If this
> situation does not change then basically 1 of the 2 components of the
> TBB cannot really be trusted. How can we really ever have a trusted
> computing platform if one of the 2 TBBs can be compromised? Perhaps
> this issue is being addressed when I read the phrase "TPM-compliant
> BIOS."
>
> 3) A trusted computing platform using a 1.2 TPM, and Windows Vista can
> enable Secure Startup and BitLocker drive encryption to secure data
> cryptographically. If the drive from this trusted computing platform
> is stolen and placed into another system running another operating
> system then what is the attacker missing in order to access the data?
> The same thing they were missing before the trusted computing platform
> was around- the encryption key. Therefore, doesn't the attacker
> still have the same methods of brute force attack at their disposal for
> cracking the encryption of the volume? How does the TPM make this
> different once the drive has been removed from the system?
>
> 4) I am trying to write scripts to perform basic TPM management tasks.
> Microsoft has some documentation on the WIn32_Tpm class which is
> supposed to be used for this sort of thing, but I have not had any
> success getting scripts to work on my Windows Vista 32-bit or 64-bit
> installations. In the end I simply tried to search for the Win32_Tpm,
> and could not even find it. The method for searching for the class was
> to use the script below, and then pipe it to | findstr /I "Win32_Tpm".
>
> =======================================
> strComputer = "."
> strNamespace = "\root"
>
> Set objSWbemServices = GetObject("winmgmts:\" & strComputer &
> strNamespace)
>
> Set colClasses = objSWbemServices.SubClassesOf()
> For Each objClass in colClasses
> Wscript.Echo objClass.Path_.Path
> Next
> =======================================
>
> I have some more questions floating around somewhere, but this is a
> good start.
>
> Thanks in advance for your replies.
>
> Matt


Posted by Matty on December 31, 2006, 3:44 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
Thanks, I have another question to add. It is my understanding that
the CRTM and TPM are the trusted base of the system. The CRTM does not
relinquish control of the system to anotehr piece of code until it
takes an integrity measurement of the code. This measurement is stored
in a PCR in the TPM, but the PCRs are cleared upon platform reset. So
if the system does not have a prior PCR value (an SHA-1 hash) to
compare the new measurement to how does it verify that the measurement
it just took indicates that the code is trustworthy?

My thought is that since the code that is taking the measurement seems
to be measuring system or application files which do not change then
perhaps something like the NIST National Software Reference Library can
be used to verify the integrity of the code. However, I haven't seen
anything about this in any of the TCG or MS documentation. Generally
the process is just described as "each piece of code takes a
measurement, writes the metrics to the Storage Measurement Log (SML),
and then creates a SHA-1 hash of it which is stored in the PCR in the
TPM."

My problem is, okay the measurement has been taken. How does the
system know whether the measurement indicates trustworthiness or not?

Thanks

PA Bear wrote:
> Forwarded to microsoft.public.windows.vista.security newsgroup via
> crosspost.
> --
> ~Robear Dyer (PA Bear)
> MS MVP-Windows (IE, OE, Security, Shell/User)
>
> Matty wrote:
> > Hi there all, I am working on a document on Windows Vista TPM Services,
> > and I have several questions I'm hoping someone can answer as well as
> > several thoughts I'd like some feedback on. Feel free to address any
> > combination of my comments/points, but I ask that you please try to be
> > informative and thoughtful in your reply- I'd like to really learn
> > something after all ;-)
> > 1) Is the Endorsement Key used to create the hashes of integrity
> > monitoring/reporting metrics? If not, what key is used?
> >
> > 2) The TBB of a trusted platform is the TPM and the CRTM. The CRTM is
> > either a portion of or the entire BIOS code. Both of these components
> > must be trusted, and updates must be controlled. However, currently
> > 3rd party BIOSes are prevalent, and anyone can update them. If this
> > situation does not change then basically 1 of the 2 components of the
> > TBB cannot really be trusted. How can we really ever have a trusted
> > computing platform if one of the 2 TBBs can be compromised? Perhaps
> > this issue is being addressed when I read the phrase "TPM-compliant
> > BIOS."
> >
> > 3) A trusted computing platform using a 1.2 TPM, and Windows Vista can
> > enable Secure Startup and BitLocker drive encryption to secure data
> > cryptographically. If the drive from this trusted computing platform
> > is stolen and placed into another system running another operating
> > system then what is the attacker missing in order to access the data?
> > The same thing they were missing before the trusted computing platform
> > was around- the encryption key. Therefore, doesn't the attacker
> > still have the same methods of brute force attack at their disposal for
> > cracking the encryption of the volume? How does the TPM make this
> > different once the drive has been removed from the system?
> >
> > 4) I am trying to write scripts to perform basic TPM management tasks.
> > Microsoft has some documentation on the WIn32_Tpm class which is
> > supposed to be used for this sort of thing, but I have not had any
> > success getting scripts to work on my Windows Vista 32-bit or 64-bit
> > installations. In the end I simply tried to search for the Win32_Tpm,
> > and could not even find it. The method for searching for the class was
> > to use the script below, and then pipe it to | findstr /I "Win32_Tpm".
> >
> > =======================================
> > strComputer = "."
> > strNamespace = "\root"
> >
> > Set objSWbemServices = GetObject("winmgmts:\" & strComputer &
> > strNamespace)
> >
> > Set colClasses = objSWbemServices.SubClassesOf()
> > For Each objClass in colClasses
> > Wscript.Echo objClass.Path_.Path
> > Next
> > =======================================
> >
> > I have some more questions floating around somewhere, but this is a
> > good start.
> >
> > Thanks in advance for your replies.
> >
> > Matt


Posted by =?Utf-8?B?RGFu?= on December 31, 2006, 3:47 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
Thanks, I have another question to add. It is my understanding that the CRTM
and TPM are the trusted base of the system. The CRTM does not relinquish
control of the system to anotehr piece of code until it takes an integrity
measurement of the code. This measurement is stored in a PCR in the TPM, but
the PCRs are cleared upon platform reset. So if the system does not have a
prior PCR value (an SHA-1 hash) to compare the new measurement to how does it
verify that the measurement it just took indicates that the code is
trustworthy?

My thought is that since the code that is taking the measurement seems to be
measuring system or application files which do not change then perhaps
something like the NIST National Software Reference Library can be used to
verify the integrity of the code. However, I haven't seen anything about
this in any of the TCG or MS documentation. Generally the process is just
described as "each piece of code takes a measurement, writes the metrics to
the Storage Measurement Log (SML), and then creates a SHA-1 hash of it which
is stored in the PCR in the TPM."

My problem is, okay the measurement has been taken. How does the system
know whether the measurement indicates trustworthiness or not?

Thanks

"PA Bear" wrote:

> Forwarded to microsoft.public.windows.vista.security newsgroup via
> crosspost.
> --
> ~Robear Dyer (PA Bear)
> MS MVP-Windows (IE, OE, Security, Shell/User)
>
> Matty wrote:
> > Hi there all, I am working on a document on Windows Vista TPM Services,
> > and I have several questions I'm hoping someone can answer as well as
> > several thoughts I'd like some feedback on. Feel free to address any
> > combination of my comments/points, but I ask that you please try to be
> > informative and thoughtful in your reply- I'd like to really learn
> > something after all ;-)
> > 1) Is the Endorsement Key used to create the hashes of integrity
> > monitoring/reporting metrics? If not, what key is used?
> >
> > 2) The TBB of a trusted platform is the TPM and the CRTM. The CRTM is
> > either a portion of or the entire BIOS code. Both of these components
> > must be trusted, and updates must be controlled. However, currently
> > 3rd party BIOSes are prevalent, and anyone can update them. If this
> > situation does not change then basically 1 of the 2 components of the
> > TBB cannot really be trusted. How can we really ever have a trusted
> > computing platform if one of the 2 TBBs can be compromised? Perhaps
> > this issue is being addressed when I read the phrase "TPM-compliant
> > BIOS."
> >
> > 3) A trusted computing platform using a 1.2 TPM, and Windows Vista can
> > enable Secure Startup and BitLocker drive encryption to secure data
> > cryptographically. If the drive from this trusted computing platform
> > is stolen and placed into another system running another operating
> > system then what is the attacker missing in order to access the data?
> > The same thing they were missing before the trusted computing platform
> > was around- the encryption key. Therefore, doesn't the attacker
> > still have the same methods of brute force attack at their disposal for
> > cracking the encryption of the volume? How does the TPM make this
> > different once the drive has been removed from the system?
> >
> > 4) I am trying to write scripts to perform basic TPM management tasks.
> > Microsoft has some documentation on the WIn32_Tpm class which is
> > supposed to be used for this sort of thing, but I have not had any
> > success getting scripts to work on my Windows Vista 32-bit or 64-bit
> > installations. In the end I simply tried to search for the Win32_Tpm,
> > and could not even find it. The method for searching for the class was
> > to use the script below, and then pipe it to | findstr /I "Win32_Tpm".
> >
> > =======================================
> > strComputer = "."
> > strNamespace = "\root"
> >
> > Set objSWbemServices = GetObject("winmgmts:\" & strComputer &
> > strNamespace)
> >
> > Set colClasses = objSWbemServices.SubClassesOf()
> > For Each objClass in colClasses
> > Wscript.Echo objClass.Path_.Path
> > Next
> > =======================================
> >
> > I have some more questions floating around somewhere, but this is a
> > good start.
> >
> > Thanks in advance for your replies.
> >
> > Matt
>
>

Posted by Jamie Hunter [MS] on January 1, 2007, 12:35 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
Hi Dan,

Hopefully my previous reply touched on this, the system is effectively
compared to the state when BitLocker is enabled.
You may also be interested in reading this:
http://blogs.msdn.com/si_team/archive/2006/10/03/Multi_2D00_boot-Security.aspx
--
Jamie Hunter [MS]

> Thanks, I have another question to add. It is my understanding that the
> CRTM
> and TPM are the trusted base of the system. The CRTM does not relinquish
> control of the system to anotehr piece of code until it takes an integrity
> measurement of the code. This measurement is stored in a PCR in the TPM,
> but
> the PCRs are cleared upon platform reset. So if the system does not have
> a
> prior PCR value (an SHA-1 hash) to compare the new measurement to how does
> it
> verify that the measurement it just took indicates that the code is
> trustworthy?
>
> My thought is that since the code that is taking the measurement seems to
> be
> measuring system or application files which do not change then perhaps
> something like the NIST National Software Reference Library can be used to
> verify the integrity of the code. However, I haven't seen anything about
> this in any of the TCG or MS documentation. Generally the process is just
> described as "each piece of code takes a measurement, writes the metrics
> to
> the Storage Measurement Log (SML), and then creates a SHA-1 hash of it
> which
> is stored in the PCR in the TPM."
>
> My problem is, okay the measurement has been taken. How does the system
> know whether the measurement indicates trustworthiness or not?
>
> Thanks
>
> "PA Bear" wrote:
>
>> Forwarded to microsoft.public.windows.vista.security newsgroup via
>> crosspost.
>> --
>> ~Robear Dyer (PA Bear)
>> MS MVP-Windows (IE, OE, Security, Shell/User)
>>
>> Matty wrote:
>> > Hi there all, I am working on a document on Windows Vista TPM Services,
>> > and I have several questions I'm hoping someone can answer as well as
>> > several thoughts I'd like some feedback on. Feel free to address any
>> > combination of my comments/points, but I ask that you please try to be
>> > informative and thoughtful in your reply- I'd like to really learn
>> > something after all ;-)
>> > 1) Is the Endorsement Key used to create the hashes of integrity
>> > monitoring/reporting metrics? If not, what key is used?
>> >
>> > 2) The TBB of a trusted platform is the TPM and the CRTM. The CRTM is
>> > either a portion of or the entire BIOS code. Both of these components
>> > must be trusted, and updates must be controlled. However, currently
>> > 3rd party BIOSes are prevalent, and anyone can update them. If this
>> > situation does not change then basically 1 of the 2 components of the
>> > TBB cannot really be trusted. How can we really ever have a trusted
>> > computing platform if one of the 2 TBBs can be compromised? Perhaps
>> > this issue is being addressed when I read the phrase "TPM-compliant
>> > BIOS."
>> >
>> > 3) A trusted computing platform using a 1.2 TPM, and Windows Vista can
>> > enable Secure Startup and BitLocker drive encryption to secure data
>> > cryptographically. If the drive from this trusted computing platform
>> > is stolen and placed into another system running another operating
>> > system then what is the attacker missing in order to access the data?
>> > The same thing they were missing before the trusted computing platform
>> > was around- the encryption key. Therefore, doesn't the attacker
>> > still have the same methods of brute force attack at their disposal for
>> > cracking the encryption of the volume? How does the TPM make this
>> > different once the drive has been removed from the system?
>> >
>> > 4) I am trying to write scripts to perform basic TPM management tasks.
>> > Microsoft has some documentation on the WIn32_Tpm class which is
>> > supposed to be used for this sort of thing, but I have not had any
>> > success getting scripts to work on my Windows Vista 32-bit or 64-bit
>> > installations. In the end I simply tried to search for the Win32_Tpm,
>> > and could not even find it. The method for searching for the class was
>> > to use the script below, and then pipe it to | findstr /I "Win32_Tpm".
>> >
>> > =======================================
>> > strComputer = "."
>> > strNamespace = "\root"
>> >
>> > Set objSWbemServices = GetObject("winmgmts:\" & strComputer &
>> > strNamespace)
>> >
>> > Set colClasses = objSWbemServices.SubClassesOf()
>> > For Each objClass in colClasses
>> > Wscript.Echo objClass.Path_.Path
>> > Next
>> > =======================================
>> >
>> > I have some more questions floating around somewhere, but this is a
>> > good start.
>> >
>> > Thanks in advance for your replies.
>> >
>> > Matt
>>
>>


Similar ThreadsPosted
2008 Trend Micro Internet Security is NOT is compatible with Windows Vista SP1 and Windows XP SP3 February 1, 2008, 2:38 pm
Securing Windows services June 3, 2008, 1:13 pm
Services - Windows Server 2003 R2 November 6, 2006, 10:48 am
WSFU - Windows services for Unix - SECURITY June 4, 2007, 7:52 am
Windows 2003 , MSDE 2000, Terminal Services January 12, 2008, 3:23 am
Certificate Services features vs Windows 2003 server editions May 24, 2006, 3:17 pm
Windows Vista and Rootkits November 4, 2005, 12:49 pm
MSI vs Windows Vista Home February 7, 2008, 9:09 am
Windows Vista Upgrade UAC issue May 29, 2007, 8:50 pm
Windows Vista still Rife with Insecure Code July 18, 2006, 10:51 pm

The site map in XML format XML site map

Contact Us | Privacy Policy