Value of SSL client certificates?

Value of SSL client certificates?

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Subject Author Date
Value of SSL client certificates? Isak 10-19-2007
Posted by Todd H. on October 20, 2007, 12:02 am
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> I'm looking for input on authentication mechanisms for a financial
> service.

Who are the users? How many of em are there?

> We don't think that username+password login across a https connection
> sounds secure enough by itself, and are looking for ways to increase
> security.

Specifically what threats are you looking to counter?

> One-time passwords over e.g. SMS as a second step after successful
> login sounds very good, but we have concerns about the associated
> costs.

Novel idea. SMS as in texting a message to the client's cell phone
with a one time password? Do all the users have cell phones? Can SMS
delivery be reliable and timely enough for a user waiting to log in?
Not likely.

> Client side certificates were brought up as a cheaper option. It's one
> more technical hurdle for our users, but if they make up for it in
> security, and we save more than our support cost goes up, I guess they
> could be worth it.

If your clients are users in the general public, I see HUGE support
costs here in addition to the cert cost.


> A client cert does prevent brute-forcing random accounts; you'd have
> to gain access to the certificate first. And if you do gain access to
> a certificate, intercepting a one-time password as it's being
> submitted probably isn't a lot harder..
>
>
> Thoughts? Any suggestions appreciated,


Some banks are issuing secureid tokens (or the like) these days.


Alternatively, a credit union I recently worked with has migrated to a
login auth system that first prompts for account number. It auths
that against known accounts, and looks at the source IP. If the user
has logged in from that IP before, they are prompted for their
password, on a page showing a user-selected pictures and a phrase.

If the user is logging in from a new IP for the first time, instead of
a password prompt, they are prompted to answer one of 5 security
questions they've selected and answered during account setup. Upon
successful answering, their new IP is registered, and they are given a
password prompt.

This approach seems to be a decent balance of security vs usability.
It does also seem to protect against phishing for the client who will
be lookin for their familiar picture and phrase they selected. It
also thwarts password attacks because to even get to the password
prompt, the correct answer to a randomly selected out of 5 question
needs to be provided, which greatly increases the complexity of any
scripted attack.

If a client is infected with malware, you've still got problems. And
there will be more calls to your helpdesk, but it is lower cost of
entry than issuing every customer a token they need to figure out and
your infrastructure needs to support.

Best Regards,
--
Todd H.
http://www.toddh.net/

Posted by Isak on October 23, 2007, 9:04 am
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On Oct 20, 6:02 am, comph...@toddh.net (Todd H.) wrote:
> > I'm looking for input on authentication mechanisms for a financial
> > service.
>
> Who are the users? How many of em are there?
>

General public. Thousands to tens of thousands if things pan out.


> > We don't think that username+password login across a https connection
> > sounds secure enough by itself, and are looking for ways to increase
> > security.
>
> Specifically what threats are you looking to counter?
>

I guess distributed brute forcing / dict attacs are the main threats
we can do something against..?


> > One-time passwords over e.g. SMS as a second step after successful
> > login sounds very good, but we have concerns about the associated
> > costs.
>
> Novel idea. SMS as in texting a message to the client's cell phone
> with a one time password? Do all the users have cell phones? Can SMS
> delivery be reliable and timely enough for a user waiting to log in?
> Not likely.
>

It's actually a fairly common scheme around here. Pretty much anyone
has a cellphone, and if we exclude those w/o internet access, I'm sure
cell coverage is pretty much 100%.


> > Client side certificates were brought up as a cheaper option. It's one
> > more technical hurdle for our users, but if they make up for it in
> > security, and we save more than our support cost goes up, I guess they
> > could be worth it.
>
> If your clients are users in the general public, I see HUGE support
> costs here in addition to the cert cost.
>
> > A client cert does prevent brute-forcing random accounts; you'd have
> > to gain access to the certificate first. And if you do gain access to
> > a certificate, intercepting a one-time password as it's being
> > submitted probably isn't a lot harder..
>
> > Thoughts? Any suggestions appreciated,
>
> Some banks are issuing secureid tokens (or the like) these days.
>
> Alternatively, a credit union I recently worked with has migrated to a
> login auth system that first prompts for account number. It auths
> that against known accounts, and looks at the source IP. If the user
> has logged in from that IP before, they are prompted for their
> password, on a page showing a user-selected pictures and a phrase.
>
> If the user is logging in from a new IP for the first time, instead of
> a password prompt, they are prompted to answer one of 5 security
> questions they've selected and answered during account setup. Upon
> successful answering, their new IP is registered, and they are given a
> password prompt.
>
> This approach seems to be a decent balance of security vs usability.
> It does also seem to protect against phishing for the client who will
> be lookin for their familiar picture and phrase they selected. It
> also thwarts password attacks because to even get to the password
> prompt, the correct answer to a randomly selected out of 5 question
> needs to be provided, which greatly increases the complexity of any
> scripted attack.
>

Whitelisting by IP sounds like an interesting option for limiting the
use of one-time passwords.


Thank you,
Isak

> If a client is infected with malware, you've still got problems. And
> there will be more calls to your helpdesk, but it is lower cost of
> entry than issuing every customer a token they need to figure out and
> your infrastructure needs to support.
>
> Best Regards,
> --
> Todd H.http://www.toddh.net/



Posted by cis.gong@gmail.com on October 22, 2007, 1:34 am
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> I'm looking for input on authentication mechanisms for a financial
> service.
>
> We don't think that username+password login across a https connection
> sounds secure enough by itself, and are looking for ways to increase
> security.

For practicality, username+password is considerable. We just need to
add some verification mechanism, such as token card, ekey, etc.

> One-time passwords over e.g. SMS as a second step after successful
> login sounds very good, but we have concerns about the associated
> costs.

Nowadays, copy a sim card is very easy. The idea that use sim for
authorization is not comfortable in some restrict applications.

> Client side certificates were brought up as a cheaper option. It's one
> more technical hurdle for our users, but if they make up for it in
> security, and we save more than our support cost goes up, I guess they
> could be worth it.

Client certification only provides the authentication of the used
public key, for authorization, there are still many works need to be
done. E.g., we can use this public key to exchange session key in
Diffie-Hellman protocol.

> A client cert does prevent brute-forcing random accounts; you'd have
> to gain access to the certificate first. And if you do gain access to
> a certificate, intercepting a one-time password as it's being
> submitted probably isn't a lot harder..
>
> Thoughts? Any suggestions appreciated,
> Isak



Posted by Paul Rubin on October 23, 2007, 2:58 pm
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> I'm looking for input on authentication mechanisms for a financial
> service. ... [other post:] general public, 10,000's of users.
> Thoughts? Any suggestions appreciated,

You really want hardware authentication tokens like Paypal is now using.

https://www.paypal.com/securitykey

Posted by David Wagner on October 23, 2007, 6:07 pm
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Paul Rubin wrote:
>You really want hardware authentication tokens like Paypal is now using.
>https://www.paypal.com/securitykey

How does this defend against man-in-the-middle phishing attacks?
(I'm talking about attacks where the attacker presents a spoofed
web site, and acts as a man-in-the-middle relaying challenges and
responses between the victim and the legitimate website.)

See also:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/the_failure_of.html

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