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Posted by Isak on October 23, 2007, 8:50 am
If you were Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options On Oct 19, 7:25 pm, d...@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu (David Wagner)
wrote:
> Client certs seem like an effective way to authenticate the
> browser. One thing that's nice about them is that hopefully
> they are not as susceptible to phishing: the user cannot disclose
> a credential that the user does not know (e.g., the private key).
>
We'd have to automate the cert generation process, using some stronger
form of authentication (one-time passwords / SMS), which would again
make us susceptible to phishing. Protecting people from themselves is
hard.
> I've always heard concerns raised about (a) browser support for
> client certs, and (b) help desk calls. I'd be curious to hear
> your views on whether those concerns are still relevant today.
>
I assume (a) is "solved" these days. I've seen mention of issues with
key sizes larger then 1kbit, but not sure how recent that was.
I think (b) is still a major issue, no matter how streamlined and
simple we/the browser developers make the process..
> Also one issue with client certs is that they only authenticate
> the machine or the browser. If the user uses a different machine
> to log in, that other machine won't have their client cert, so
> they will have to "register" that other machine (by generating a
> new client cert for that machine). Same if they re-install the
> OS or possibly even if they change browsers. One question is,
> how cheap and easy can you make that? Another question is, is
> that acceptable?
>
Yup, that's the question. As we'll need some additional auth mechanism
for cert generation, I'm not sure what we could gain.
As far as I can see, it all boils down to cost / complexity of sending
out more text messages vs. cost / increased complexity of doing both
sms & client certs.
Regards,
Isak
> I'd be interested to hear your take on these concerns. If client
> certs are practically feasible, it seems to me like they have some
> good security properties -- but I don't know enough about the
> practicalities of using them.
>
> You might also want to ask on Perry Metzger's cryptography mailing
> list.
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