deleted files

deleted files

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Subject Author Date
deleted files Stuart Miller 11-14-2006
---> Re: deleted files Sebastian Gotts...11-14-2006
  ---> Re: deleted files Sebastian Gotts...11-15-2006
      `--> Re: deleted files Sebastian Gotts...11-15-2006
Posted by Stuart Miller on November 14, 2006, 2:33 am
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As I understand NTFS, once a file is deleted then removed from the recycle
bin it is not recoverable by ordinary means.
Therer may be utilities out there to do that, and certainly after a defrag
it will likely be gone. No problem there, but are files recoverable?

Problem is the other way around, here. I deleted a set of files, emptied
recycle bin, deleted more the next day and emptied again. Today the first
set of files were back in the folder that had been deleted from. Only
explanation I can think of is they there was a brief power outage that day,
so the system went down and restarted. I remember win98 and 95 used to do
these automatic registry restores periodically, but I didn't think that
deleted files and former folder contents were stored in the registry.

From a security point of view - does this mean that deleted files, with
recycle bin emptied, are not really deleted?

Thanks

Stuart



Posted by Sebastian Gottschalk on November 14, 2006, 6:17 pm
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Jim wrote:

> they're not - FAT file systems have two FAT tables. One's a backup; not that
> that does much good, because it's essentially a mirror of the primary.
> NTFS uses journaling and backgrounding to give the illusion of a faster
> filesystem. Now, the backgrounding (which makes heavy use of the large
> caches found on very modern drives) isn't much use to you if there's a
> power cut or if you're running a PVR on your system (you need realtime
> writing to disk - no caching), however the journal is where you become
> unstuck from a security viewpoint.

I'd worry much more about the MFT Mirror (same as FAT table backup). The
journal is easily cleared by filling it up with writing some bogus data.

>> From a security point of view - does this mean that deleted files, with
>> recycle bin emptied, are not really deleted?
>>
>
> answer: deleting a file on an NTFS filesystem merely removes it from the
> current journal. The file is still physically on the drive. The allocated
> space is flagged for overwriting and bumped to the back of the write queue,
> where it is forgotten about, until it reaches the front of the write queue
> and is overwritten. On an average system, this can take /months/
> considering light usage (browsing, writing documents, etc). On a heavy-use
> system (such as a PVR) this can take a few days. Or even a few hours. Even
> then the chances of that space being entirely overwritten in order are
> fairly remote, so something of the original file will remain - very likely
> enough to use as evidence after a forensic search.

However, with competent tools like SDelete or Eraser you can clear all free
disk space, all free MFT entries and the journal. Only filenames of deleted
files with pose a problem, and therefore one should at least rename the
files before deletion (those and many other tools do that automatically).

> To expand: a normal format does not erase the contents of a partition.
> Neither does repartitioning. All these do is to rewrite the partition and
> FAT tables. The data area is basically untouched until it comes to actually
> writing data to it with pointers from whatever filesystem resource locator
> you're using (NTFS, FAT, whatever). The only sure way of destroying data
> beyond recoverability (apart from physically destroying the disk) is to
> make multiple passes over hte drive with military-grade hard disk lowlevel
> formatting software*.

What about just one pass (because it simply *is* sufficient) with freely
available tools?

> HD controllers nowadays are smart enough to rebuild themselves
> after a LLF, so it's pretty safe to LLF a drive maybe half a dozen times
> during its lifetime (being a very intensive operation, modern drives get
> bloody hot during a LLF, so definitely not recommended without ample
> cooling!)

Today a low-level format only consists of filling the raw disk with zeros,
but not rebuilding the internal organization structure. And wenn, you can
easily do that with a 'dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/hdX bs=1m' on your own.

Posted by erewhon on November 14, 2006, 7:10 pm
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> What about just one pass (because it simply *is* sufficient) with freely
> available tools?

Do you make this stuff up as you go along?!

One pass is NOT sufficient to remove the data to a point at which it cannot
be recovered. It will fool most data reading tools, but certainly not
systematic, low level magnetic analysis of the platter. For that you need to
sufficiently break up the magnetic storage to the point there it is
indistinguishable from random fluctuations.

One pass might stop your basic data scavenger - it sure as hell won't stop
the pro's.



Posted by Jim on November 14, 2006, 8:38 pm
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erewhon came up with this when s/he headbutted the keyboard a moment ago in
alt.computer.security:

>
>> What about just one pass (because it simply *is* sufficient) with freely
>> available tools?
>
> Do you make this stuff up as you go along?!
>
> One pass is NOT sufficient to remove the data to a point at which it
cannot
> be recovered. It will fool most data reading tools, but certainly not
> systematic, low level magnetic analysis of the platter. For that you need
to
> sufficiently break up the magnetic storage to the point there it is
> indistinguishable from random fluctuations.
>
> One pass might stop your basic data scavenger - it sure as hell won't stop
> the pro's.

hence my mention of military grade formatting tools - which destroy the data
to the point where it is practically impossible to recover anything even
with the cleanest of cleanrooms and all the time in the world - assuming
you even knew precisely what you were looking for.

I'm a pro.
--
-*- Linux Desktops & Clustering Solutions -*- http://dotware.co.uk
-*- Registered Linux user #426308 -*- http://counter.li.org
-*- Linux is like a wigwam: no Windows, no Gates, and Apache inside.
-*- <discl mode="Boilerplate" />

Posted by kurt wismer on November 15, 2006, 12:24 am
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Jim wrote:
> erewhon came up with this when s/he headbutted the keyboard a moment ago in
> alt.computer.security:
>
>>> What about just one pass (because it simply *is* sufficient) with freely
>>> available tools?
>> Do you make this stuff up as you go along?!
>>
>> One pass is NOT sufficient to remove the data to a point at which it
> cannot
>> be recovered. It will fool most data reading tools, but certainly not
>> systematic, low level magnetic analysis of the platter. For that you need
> to
>> sufficiently break up the magnetic storage to the point there it is
>> indistinguishable from random fluctuations.
>>
>> One pass might stop your basic data scavenger - it sure as hell won't stop
>> the pro's.
>
> hence my mention of military grade formatting tools - which destroy the data
> to the point where it is practically impossible to recover anything even
> with the cleanest of cleanrooms and all the time in the world - assuming
> you even knew precisely what you were looking for.
>
> I'm a pro.

if you're a pro then i guess you know that the military physically
destroys any media that has ever contained data above a certain security
classification because they know that nothing you do with software will
achieve the data sanitation you allude to above...

--
"it's not the right time to be sober
now the idiots have taken over
spreading like a social cancer,
is there an answer?"

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