Actually the EA-6B did have gold-treated canopies:
http://www.hazegray.org/faq/smn4.htm#D6

Juergen Nieveler
--
Hearing an "Aw, shit" soon after an "on-the-waaay!" means you¢re probably
not getting that promotion.

Posted by Winged on November 30, 2005, 7:52 pm

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nemo_outis wrote:

> ....

>>The nice thing about such passphrases is that they can often be

>>"assembled" in the input window just as I did above, rather than

>>entered directly in final form.

> ....

> A few things I forgot to add:

> "Assembling" a passphrase in an password input window can be severely

> hampered if the window is blanked with asterisks. Here's a trick: assemble

> the passphrase in the *user name* window and then cut and paste it to the

> password window (afterwards, go back and fill in the user name).

> For the theoretically inclined, the Shannon entropy of ordinary English

> sentences is about 1.2 to 1.4 bits per character. This gives an alternate

> method of calculating passphrase entropy.

> Regards,

While I agree with passphrase concept, I prefer tokens (smartcards).

Some systems have limits as to usable PW length. Additionally since the
system should lock after a short period of inactivity to prevent someone
from entering system if a user leaves their terminal, it can be painful
re-entering long passphrases. This does cause complaint. Storing very
long and complex passwords on smartcards with unique passwords stored on
the smartcard for each required system locks out possibility of
dictionary attacks. This is further enhanced if your company servers
lock password with 2 missed attempts (password "should" always be good
but sometimes gurgles occur). This assists in log review if you see bad
password attempts on accounts, as you shouldn't see many on any system.

Meanwhile the user typically has to remember one short pin on their
smartcard to access many systems. Of course the smart card locks with 3
missed pin attempts and inevitably users do lock their cards, but this
is relatively seldom. A 128k card holds an amazing number of
credentials, more than enough for most mortals.

Winged

Posted by nemo_outis on November 30, 2005, 7:59 pm

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> nemo_outis wrote:

>> ....

>>>The nice thing about such passphrases is that they can often be

>>>"assembled" in the input window just as I did above, rather than

>>>entered directly in final form.

>> ....

>> A few things I forgot to add:

>> "Assembling" a passphrase in an password input window can be severely

>> hampered if the window is blanked with asterisks. Here's a trick:

>> assemble the passphrase in the *user name* window and then cut and

>> paste it to the password window (afterwards, go back and fill in the

>> user name).

>> For the theoretically inclined, the Shannon entropy of ordinary

>> English sentences is about 1.2 to 1.4 bits per character. This gives

>> an alternate method of calculating passphrase entropy.

>> Regards,

> While I agree with passphrase concept, I prefer tokens (smartcards).

> Some systems have limits as to usable PW length. Additionally since

> the system should lock after a short period of inactivity to prevent

> someone from entering system if a user leaves their terminal, it can

> be painful re-entering long passphrases. This does cause complaint.

> Storing very long and complex passwords on smartcards with unique

> passwords stored on the smartcard for each required system locks out

> possibility of dictionary attacks. This is further enhanced if your

> company servers lock password with 2 missed attempts (password

> "should" always be good but sometimes gurgles occur). This assists in

> log review if you see bad password attempts on accounts, as you

> shouldn't see many on any system.

> Meanwhile the user typically has to remember one short pin on their

> smartcard to access many systems. Of course the smart card locks with

> 3 missed pin attempts and inevitably users do lock their cards, but

> this is relatively seldom. A 128k card holds an amazing number of

> credentials, more than enough for most mortals.

> Winged

You raise some very valid points. I suppose (depending on particular
circumstances) security should be provided by a judicious blend of what
you know (passwords or passphrases), what you possess (smartcards or
equivalents), and who you are (biometrics).

Regards,