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Subject Author Date
Secure passwords? AV 11-30-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Borked Pseudo M...12-01-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Borked Pseudo M...12-01-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Thrasher Remail...12-02-2005
`--> Re: Secure passwords? Hairy One Kenob...12-10-2005
Posted by nemo_outis on December 14, 2005, 2:34 pm
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>
>> Instead, my differential equation solving
>> usually deals with the nastier Navier-Stokes differential equations
>> applicable to fluid dynamics. But, really, all this is beside the
>> point; DEs have only a tangential bearing on the issues we're
>> discussing.
>
> If I hadn't covered them 20+ years ago in my first year of college,
> I'd probably be very impressed with that statement ;o)


It's been 44 years since my first year of university. Hell, I was on the
point of graduating before the first paper on the Fast Fourier Transform
was even published (Cooley & Tukey 1965). We tended to rely on Laplace
transforms in those ancient days. And we went for analytical solutions
to our differential equations, not just mindless number-crunching :-)


...
> You'd be surprised.. after all, what's actually inside the box is the
> same as the semi-shielded version (I say "semi", because EM shielding
> has been a requirement for a not inconsiderable time). All that's
> changed is the degree of shielding, and materials technology is
> roughly constant throughout th universe.


What could be more trivial than a hard-disk? An electric motor that
spins an aluminum disk covered with rust particles, a pivoting-arm read-
write head reminiscent of that on an ancient phono turntable, and ten
cents worth of electronics. And yet, silly me, I choose to buy them
rather than make my own. And so with Tempest equipment.


...
> I'm not entirely sure who you're arguing with at this point. After
> all, I've already pointed out that it's been the general rule to
> shield buildings and particlar enclosures, rather than buy specialised
> expensive kit. Maybe I should have put a timeframe in there? How about
> "two decades" (true for the UK, no idea about the US).


Not so much arguing as clarifying. I believe that Tempest is a very low
risk threat for most people (in large part because much easier
alternatives are usually available to our adversaries) and that scarce
security money is usually best spent elsewhere. Specific situations may
differ, of course.

But for those who DO need Tempest equipment, rolling one's own is a
clumsy makeshift and an invitation to disaster. I wouldn't do my own
appendectomy either - even if I had read all about it, seen one done,
and had a surgical-instrument catalogue. Nope, I would go to a specialist
who does such things for a living and get it done right with all the
followup support required!



>> Moving on to your comment on proximity control, I can only presume
>> you have a Real Estate licence and are hoping to cash in. Increasing
>> the distance by a factor of 10 only gives a 20 dB drop in signal
>> strength; a distance factor of 100 gives 40 dB, 1000 give 60 dB, and
>> 100,000 gives 100 dB! Most of us do not own hundreds of square
>> miles of Nevada desert in order to get 100 dB signal reduction
>> through "proximity control" - it is only a supplementary method that,
>> in practice, might save you one zone.
>
> Forgive me for saying, but that sounds like some reading from a set of
> tables, rather than doing any calculations. You *do* know that dB is
> an exponential unit, rather than linear? That each 3dB indicates a
> /halving/ in signal level?
>
> Measure your signal drop-off by taking your distance and applying the
> inverse-square rule (as defined by Newton in the seventeenth century),
> then take the base-10 logarithm and multiply by -10. Simple.
>
> And, of course, largely irrelevant in the electronic Real World (which
> tends to have variable permittivity, most of us not living in a
> complete vacuum and all ;o)



If you check I think you will find that my math is impeccable. In a free-
field intensity drops as the square of the distance: 20 dB for a tenfold
increase in distance. Exactly as expressed above.

And, as the paper by Kuhn I cited in my last post shows, once you're
outside any buildings you are in a near-perfect free field. Morever, the
difference in permittivity of atmospheric air and a vacuum is extremely
small - negligibly small many times over if we're talking in terms of dB!

IOW my math is directly applicable to real-world situations!



> Or is someone about to argue that taking a signal below
> instrument-detectable levels and then dropping it by another order of
> magnitude is somehow useful?


I have repeatedly explained to you (supported by cites) that this is not
only possible, it is commonplace.


> Remember, with a simple 400m distance (not a magic number - just
> thinking of a particular building) you're talking a 52dB attenuation
> (assuming that pesky vacuum) - i.e. you're signal has dropped to
> 0.000625% of what you were previously looking at. If you also assume
> that no establishment with guards that aren't utterly brain-dead will
> let you lurk within 100m of the wire with a suitcaseful of dodgy
> electronics, then that drops still further, to 4 tenths of a
> thousandth of a percent.


Clearly the lot your house sits on is more commodious than mine - your
Real Estate licence must really have paid off for you :-)

In my house the distance from my computer to the nearest property line is
a little over ten meters. An observation van parked on the street would
be less than 20 m away. I believe my numbers are representative of
houses in many cities; those living in apartments or condos would have
even less assured distance available. Urban businesses (especially
those that share a building with others) would likely seldom exceed a few
tens of meters to the nearest potential observation point (sometimes much
less). The cost of a 400 m interdicted zone in an urban business setting
would be astronomically expensive!

It is widely acknowledged that full-bore Tempest specs (AMSG 720B
equivalence) require 100 dB suppression. Moreover, I believe your
attempts to dazzle folks with the "smallness" of numbers that correspond
to dB attentuation are specious. For instance, it is quite possible to
recive signals on earth from satellites several AUs away which transmit
with a power of only a few watts. I'll leave you to do the math but,
without logs and dB, prefixes like pico, atto and femto regularly appear!


> H1K

> P.S. Almost forgot - if you're not willing to order leaded glass from
> someone like Pilkington, then it's perfectly possible to buy
> self-adhesive gold film off-the-shelf and make you're own, as in the
> A6 Queer (apologies to anyone of that disposition - can't remember the
> official aircraft designation!)


Leaded glass? Gimme a break! We're not making crystal wineglasses here.
And films and embedded wire meshes are clumsy makeshifts (and I defy you
to cite any with documented RF attentuation numbers). No what is needed
is the real-meal-deal: ultra-thin vapour-deposited coatings of things
like indium-tin-oxide, sometime in multiple glass/coating layers. And
then you still have the hellish problem of electrically bonding the
entire perimeter of such glass panes to the surrounding conductive cage.
Come to think of it, it may be *easier* to build my own hard drives :-)

Regards,








Posted by Hairy One Kenobi on December 15, 2005, 1:27 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
>

<snip>

> > You'd be surprised.. after all, what's actually inside the box is the
> > same as the semi-shielded version (I say "semi", because EM shielding
> > has been a requirement for a not inconsiderable time). All that's
> > changed is the degree of shielding, and materials technology is
> > roughly constant throughout th universe.
>
> What could be more trivial than a hard-disk? An electric motor that
> spins an aluminum disk covered with rust particles, a pivoting-arm read-
> write head reminiscent of that on an ancient phono turntable, and ten
> cents worth of electronics. And yet, silly me, I choose to buy them
> rather than make my own. And so with Tempest equipment.

Hang on a minute.. as *I* remember, that's what I've ben saying all along.
And you've been saying that the specifications have some absurdly high
classification, and that the devices can't be reverse engineered..?

> > I'm not entirely sure who you're arguing with at this point. After
> > all, I've already pointed out that it's been the general rule to
> > shield buildings and particlar enclosures, rather than buy specialised
> > expensive kit. Maybe I should have put a timeframe in there? How about
> > "two decades" (true for the UK, no idea about the US).
>
>
> Not so much arguing as clarifying. I believe that Tempest is a very low
> risk threat for most people (in large part because much easier
> alternatives are usually available to our adversaries) and that scarce
> security money is usually best spent elsewhere. Specific situations may
> differ, of course.
>
> But for those who DO need Tempest equipment, rolling one's own is a
> clumsy makeshift and an invitation to disaster. I wouldn't do my own
> appendectomy either - even if I had read all about it, seen one done,
> and had a surgical-instrument catalogue. Nope, I would go to a specialist
> who does such things for a living and get it done right with all the
> followup support required!

See above.

> > Forgive me for saying, but that sounds like some reading from a set of
> > tables, rather than doing any calculations. You *do* know that dB is
> > an exponential unit, rather than linear? That each 3dB indicates a
> > /halving/ in signal level?
> >
> > Measure your signal drop-off by taking your distance and applying the
> > inverse-square rule (as defined by Newton in the seventeenth century),
> > then take the base-10 logarithm and multiply by -10. Simple.
> >
> > And, of course, largely irrelevant in the electronic Real World (which
> > tends to have variable permittivity, most of us not living in a
> > complete vacuum and all ;o)
>
> If you check I think you will find that my math is impeccable. In a free-
> field intensity drops as the square of the distance: 20 dB for a tenfold
> increase in distance. Exactly as expressed above.
>
> And, as the paper by Kuhn I cited in my last post shows, once you're
> outside any buildings you are in a near-perfect free field. Morever, the
> difference in permittivity of atmospheric air and a vacuum is extremely
> small - negligibly small many times over if we're talking in terms of dB!
>
> IOW my math is directly applicable to real-world situations!

(Cough) chain link fence (cough).

Let alone the surrounding buildings ;o)

> > Or is someone about to argue that taking a signal below
> > instrument-detectable levels and then dropping it by another order of
> > magnitude is somehow useful?
>
> I have repeatedly explained to you (supported by cites) that this is not
> only possible, it is commonplace.

Okaaayyyy... <snip comment about length of shirt sleeves>

> > Remember, with a simple 400m distance (not a magic number - just
> > thinking of a particular building) you're talking a 52dB attenuation
> > (assuming that pesky vacuum) - i.e. you're signal has dropped to
> > 0.000625% of what you were previously looking at. If you also assume
> > that no establishment with guards that aren't utterly brain-dead will
> > let you lurk within 100m of the wire with a suitcaseful of dodgy
> > electronics, then that drops still further, to 4 tenths of a
> > thousandth of a percent.
>
> Clearly the lot your house sits on is more commodious than mine - your
> Real Estate licence must really have paid off for you :-)

I've never actually lived at a government establishment (although it
certainly felt like it, some weeks!)

> In my house the distance from my computer to the nearest property line is
> a little over ten meters. An observation van parked on the street would
> be less than 20 m away. I believe my numbers are representative of
> houses in many cities

I guess we must differ on the need for Tempested kit, then - my experience
is limited to the main users (near 100%) in government, or the commercial
shielding equivilent in trading floors, etc. I've never, ever seen Tempested
kit outside of those two areas. And rarely, even then.

> It is widely acknowledged that full-bore Tempest specs (AMSG 720B
> equivalence) require 100 dB suppression.

These would be the ultra-secret specs that noone knows about? Just
checking...

> Moreover, I believe your
> attempts to dazzle folks with the "smallness" of numbers that correspond
> to dB attentuation are specious.

But accurate, given they use the self same formulae (and assumptions) of
your own figures; people tend to forget that there is a difference in, say,
the logarithmic sensitivity of the human ear and the more-or-less linear
sensitivity of a straightforward electronic transducer.

> For instance, it is quite possible to
> recive signals on earth from satellites several AUs away which transmit
> with a power of only a few watts. I'll leave you to do the math but,
> without logs and dB, prefixes like pico, atto and femto regularly appear!

Indeed it is, and indeed they do. In the latter case, much more than dB, in
fact (never come across a capacitance measured in deci-Farads), and in the
former - it would take a rather large van to hold a mobile version of
Arecibo.

> > P.S. Almost forgot - if you're not willing to order leaded glass from
> > someone like Pilkington, then it's perfectly possible to buy
> > self-adhesive gold film off-the-shelf and make you're own, as in the
> > A6 Queer (apologies to anyone of that disposition - can't remember the
> > official aircraft designation!)
>
>
> Leaded glass? Gimme a break! We're not making crystal wineglasses here.
> And films and embedded wire meshes are clumsy makeshifts (and I defy you
> to cite any with documented RF attentuation numbers). No what is needed
> is the real-meal-deal: ultra-thin vapour-deposited coatings of things

Yes - leaded glass, not lead crystal. Suggest you look up A6 types - they
*will* have figures, although whether the USN would let you see them is
something quite, quite different.

Anyway, to summarise - we now both believe that the best way to get
Tempested kit is to buy it from a manufacturer, we now both believe that the
actual shielding characteristics are reasonably well known, or, at least,
easily definable.

As far as I can tell, that really only leaves us with questions as to the
proportion of AOL users that routinely use Tempested kit to read their email
(probably measured on a logarithmic scale), and whether Grumman made their
aircraft from whiskey tumblers?

H1K



Posted by nemo_outis on December 15, 2005, 2:49 pm
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>> What could be more trivial than a hard-disk? An electric motor that
>> spins an aluminum disk covered with rust particles, a pivoting-arm
>> read- write head reminiscent of that on an ancient phono turntable,
>> and ten cents worth of electronics. And yet, silly me, I choose to
>> buy them rather than make my own. And so with Tempest equipment.
>
> Hang on a minute.. as *I* remember, that's what I've ben saying all
> along. And you've been saying that the specifications have some
> absurdly high classification, and that the devices can't be reverse
> engineered..?


You seem very eager to put words in my mouth - words I have never said.
The current emsec standards, such as NATO AMSG 720B, (and the training to
apply them as well) are classified at "secret" level and are not
available to the public. Whether you wish to characterize that as
"absurdly high" or not is your business. It does mean, however, that one
cannot engineer one's emsec equipment to the applicable specs without
such a security clearance.

Nor have I said anything about reverse-engineering being impossible. I
have said that absent publicly available specs or info on the techniques
and capabilities of those who do emsec spying, one cannot rely on causal
- or even not-so-casual - inspection of emsec-shielded equipment, even if
one has had the chance to open the box, as the basis for constructing
one's own equipment. Not that that is the sole problem with such an
approach by any means.

I reiterate, even if only for greater clarity, that it is a mug's game to
build one's own emsec-shielded equipment. Instead one buys it!


>> > Or is someone about to argue that taking a signal below
>> > instrument-detectable levels and then dropping it by another order
>> > of magnitude is somehow useful?
>>
>> I have repeatedly explained to you (supported by cites) that this is
>> not only possible, it is commonplace.
>
> Okaaayyyy... <snip comment about length of shirt sleeves>


If you had bothered to read the scholarly article by Kuhn which I cited,
one which is directly on point with regard to emsec eavsdropping on
computers, you will see that he attributes a 15 dB "processing gain" to
precisely this aspect, reinforcing the signal faster than the noise. He
discusses this at length in section 3.4 of his paper.



>> > Remember, with a simple 400m distance (not a magic number - just
>> > thinking of a particular building) you're talking a 52dB
>> > attenuation (assuming that pesky vacuum) - i.e. you're signal has
>> > dropped to 0.000625% of what you were previously looking at. If you
>> > also assume that no establishment with guards that aren't utterly
>> > brain-dead will let you lurk within 100m of the wire with a
>> > suitcaseful of dodgy electronics, then that drops still further, to
>> > 4 tenths of a thousandth of a percent.
>>
>> Clearly the lot your house sits on is more commodious than mine -
>> your Real Estate licence must really have paid off for you :-)
>
> I've never actually lived at a government establishment (although it
> certainly felt like it, some weeks!)
>
>> In my house the distance from my computer to the nearest property
>> line is a little over ten meters. An observation van parked on the
>> street would be less than 20 m away. I believe my numbers are
>> representative of houses in many cities
>
> I guess we must differ on the need for Tempested kit, then - my
> experience is limited to the main users (near 100%) in government, or
> the commercial shielding equivilent in trading floors, etc. I've
> never, ever seen Tempested kit outside of those two areas. And rarely,
> even then.


I went on at length that the ordinary user, even one with significant
security needs, has little need for Tempest equipment. But if he does
need such emsec protection he's not bloody likely to achieve it by what
you call "proximity control" with a 400-m distance to the observation
perimeter in all directions which would require a parcel of land about a
half-mile square! That's likely to be just a tad more expensive and
inconvenient than the fanciest Tempest equipment! But I suppose he could
interpose a chainlink fence instead as a sovereign remedy, couldn't he?
Yeah, that'll thwart any observation :-)


>> It is widely acknowledged that full-bore Tempest specs (AMSG 720B
>> equivalence) require 100 dB suppression.
>
> These would be the ultra-secret specs that noone knows about? Just
> checking...


The availability of one (speculative but plausible) leaked parameter
hardly constitutes availability of the spec.


>> For instance, it is quite possible to
>> recive signals on earth from satellites several AUs away which
>> transmit with a power of only a few watts. I'll leave you to do the
>> math but, without logs and dB, prefixes like pico, atto and femto
>> regularly appear!
>
> Indeed it is, and indeed they do. In the latter case, much more than
> dB, in fact (never come across a capacitance measured in deci-Farads),
> and in the former - it would take a rather large van to hold a mobile
> version of Arecibo.


Readily available (expensive, but readily available) broad-band receivers
can regularly pick up signals of a few picowatts per square meter.
Fancier (and more expensive but still publicly available) receivers using
masers, cryogenics, etc. can push this several more orders of magnitude
in sensitivity. The potential capability of a well-funded technically-
competent adversary to capture our emissions is very high. It is
motivation, not capability, which stops them. Emphasizing how small such
signals are, as you have done, is a red herring - they're eminently
detectable!


>> > P.S. Almost forgot - if you're not willing to order leaded glass
>> > from someone like Pilkington, then it's perfectly possible to buy
>> > self-adhesive gold film off-the-shelf and make you're own, as in
>> > the A6 Queer (apologies to anyone of that disposition - can't
>> > remember the official aircraft designation!)
>>
>>
>> Leaded glass? Gimme a break! We're not making crystal wineglasses
>> here. And films and embedded wire meshes are clumsy makeshifts (and I
>> defy you to cite any with documented RF attentuation numbers). No
>> what is needed is the real-meal-deal: ultra-thin vapour-deposited
>> coatings of things
>
> Yes - leaded glass, not lead crystal. Suggest you look up A6 types -
> they *will* have figures, although whether the USN would let you see
> them is something quite, quite different.


Here's a relative recent cite aimed at the intelligent layman on the
capabilities of emsec-reducing glass. Note the prominent mention of the
things I discussed (Indium-tin-oxide, metallic mesh, etc. ) and the
conspicuous absence of any discussion of leaded glass. I invite you to
support your A6 lead glass reference with a comparable cite.

Transparent Electromagnetic Compatibility Coatings
http://www.cerac.com/pubs/cmn/Cmn13_1.HTM#Transparent%20Coatings



> Anyway, to summarise - we now both believe that the best way to get
> Tempested kit is to buy it from a manufacturer, we now both believe
> that the actual shielding characteristics are reasonably well known,
> or, at least, easily definable.


The first point has been my position from the outset of this discussion;
your second point, however, is far more questionable. In fact, once again
calling your attention to the paper by Kuhn I cited earlier, his main
point is that there are NO civil specs for emsec shielding, a deficiency
his paper urges correcting and towards which he has provided a start.

Regards,


Posted by Hairy One Kenobi on December 16, 2005, 3:09 am
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<snip>

> I invite you to
> support your A6 lead glass reference with a comparable cite.

It was /gold/ film (there seems to be an awful lot of selective snipping
going on)... in any event, after a quick Google - I got it wrong. It'
*isn't* based on the A6: that's the problem with doing things from memory...

It's the E2 Hawkeye; couldn't find the picture I wanted, but this on should
give you an idea:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/images/e-2c-hawk2.jpg and
http://www.navair.navy.mil/air10/e2/e2.htm

H1K



Posted by nemo_outis on December 16, 2005, 5:33 am
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>
> <snip>
>
>> I invite you to
>> support your A6 lead glass reference with a comparable cite.
>
> It was /gold/ film (there seems to be an awful lot of selective
> snipping going on)... in any event, after a quick Google - I got it
> wrong. It' *isn't* based on the A6: that's the problem with doing
> things from memory...
>
> It's the E2 Hawkeye; couldn't find the picture I wanted, but this on
> should give you an idea:
> http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/images/e-2c-haw
> k2.jpg and http://www.navair.navy.mil/air10/e2/e2.htm
>
> H1K


Thanks for the clarification.

Hope others found the thread interesting - I did.

Regards,


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