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Subject Author Date
Secure passwords? AV 11-30-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Borked Pseudo M...12-01-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Borked Pseudo M...12-01-2005
---> Re: Secure passwords? Thrasher Remail...12-02-2005
`--> Re: Secure passwords? Hairy One Kenob...12-10-2005
Posted by Hairy One Kenobi on December 13, 2005, 3:51 am
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>
> >>
> >> > The real reason is even more simple - faster boxes tend to radiate
> >> > more and, since most of that is the computer equivilent of
> >> > "tum-te-tum, hurry up and type something", the interferance will
> >> > help to conceal unshielded keyboard and screen signals (which is
> >> > all one is interested in).
> >>
> >> The putative effects of interference are frequently overestimated. It
> >> is electronic child's play to filter interference and even, given the
> >> enormous redundancy in many signals, to extract information many
> >> decibels *below* the noise floor.
> >
> > "Child's play"? Gotta have a cite for that one.. admittedly, I'm
> > assuming that the box is somewhere close to the CRT and keyboard.
>
> Here's one example of a "canned solution" extracting signals from noise
> using FFT integration. This particular device concentrates on audio but
> the processes are quite general and apply to virtually all signal
> processing. Hell, these things are now pretty standard - they last were
> cutting edge when I read about them in Aviation Week in the 60s!
>
> http://www.baudline.com/manual/process.html

And hardly the same level of complexity! Being able to integrate a cuboid
doesn't mean that you can provide a pure solution for, say, a four-way
partial differential equation

Not that I'm saying it *can't* be done, of course - after all, aren't
weather forecasts 100% accurate? ;o)

> >> I disagree. Few have access to Tempest kit to make observations,
> >> other than illustrations in manufacturers' brochures (which disclose
> >> little other than the obvious).

> > Few != None
> >
> > Some of us may well have used such equipment for years (hint, hint)
> >
> > See above for the trivial classification level, at least here in the
> > UK.
>
>
> Those who know do not speak; those who speak do not know :-)
>
> You may, as you hint, have some level of access to these things. But
> whether that translates into understanding either the defensive and
> offensive capabilities of emsec as applied to computers is not clear -
> and likely to remain that way, I guess. Use != understand But even if
> you do understand, your understanding is of (nearly) zero value to anyone
> else if you are constrained from communicating it.

?

For the third time of saying - the classification level is the lowest level
possible, at least for the basics (i.e. how to build it). And the techniques
used aren't exactly cutting-edge, either. Nor the materials.

Have to say that I can't really understand your problem, if you've ever used
such kit. Which may or may not be likely, based on simple age - it's far
more common these days to shield the building and use off-the-shelf
equipment, except for the higher-classification networks. Even then, a small
amount of proximity control goes an awful long way.

> > Wouldn't surprise me overmuch if the exact performance characteristics
> > were stil classified - basically for what they tell you about the
> > sensors being employed. Simply estimating the weight of Tempested kit
> > should tell you how much steel has been involved in the shielding, let
> > alone simply buying something and taking it apart!
>
> Oh, the performance of most such machines is fairly clearly defined: they
> conform to some level of NATO standard AMSG 788 (& 719, 720, 784, etc. as
> well as corresponding national standards, including the simple BSI zone
> model). However, the contents of those standards are classified!
>
> But even if the standards were right in front of me, I don't want just a
> cookbook recipe (standards are generally heavy on "shalls" but silent on
> the underlying rationale). No, I want an understanding of what could be
> deployed against me, with what capabilities, at what cost, by which
> agencies. And none of that is available.
>
> Any fool (well, any technologically competent fool) can shield from emsec
> if he just throws money at the problem. RFI/EMI shielding is not exotic
> by any means; it's well-travelled technological ground. No, the trick is
> knowing whether, say, 50 dB suppression is sufficient (for a particular
> class of threat) or whether 100 dB is necessary. Big difference in cost
> (including the secondary problems that arise re ventilation & cooling,
> etc. and issues regarding usability). Moreover, even technologically
> competent fools don't just build and pray - they test and do QA on their
> designs. That means very expensive test equipment, equipment that is
> prohibitively expensive for onesy-twosy do-it-yourself projects.
>
> Regards,
>
> PS And so far we have largely confined our discussions to passive
> emsec. There is a whole other dimension of active emsec where equipment
> to be scanned is "bathed" in EM signals which the computer (or whatever
> is under investigation) modulates.

http://www.google.co.uk/search?&q=definition%3A+reverse+engineering

http://www.google.co.uk/search?&q=definition%3A+density+of+mild+steel

:o)

H1K



Posted by nemo_outis on December 13, 2005, 11:37 am
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>
>> >> The putative effects of interference are frequently overestimated.
>> >> It is electronic child's play to filter interference and even,
>> >> given the enormous redundancy in many signals, to extract
>> >> information many decibels *below* the noise floor.
>> >
>> > "Child's play"? Gotta have a cite for that one.. admittedly, I'm
>> > assuming that the box is somewhere close to the CRT and keyboard.
>>
>> Here's one example of a "canned solution" extracting signals from
>> noise using FFT integration. This particular device concentrates on
>> audio but the processes are quite general and apply to virtually all
>> signal processing. Hell, these things are now pretty standard - they
>> last were cutting edge when I read about them in Aviation Week in the
>> 60s!
>>
>> http://www.baudline.com/manual/process.html
>
> And hardly the same level of complexity! Being able to integrate a
> cuboid doesn't mean that you can provide a pure solution for, say, a
> four-way partial differential equation
>
> Not that I'm saying it *can't* be done, of course - after all, aren't
> weather forecasts 100% accurate? ;o)



An FFT is an FFT is an FFT is an FFT! (with apologies to Gertrude Stein
:-)

The technique is *very broadly applicable* to extracting signals that
contain redundancy from below the noise floor in *many* areas of signal
processing. It is one of a family of time & frequency domain transform
techniques widely used in DSP. See, for instance, a discussion of their
application with emphasis on radar in:

Time-frequency Transforms for Radar Imaging and Signal Analysis
http://www.scitechpub.com/Chen_Time_Freq.htm

As for partial differential equations, all of E&M reduces to Maxwell's 4
differential equations. And I've solved a few cases of them (trivial
cases just for waveguides). Instead, my differential equation solving
usually deals with the nastier Navier-Stokes differential equations
applicable to fluid dynamics. But, really, all this is beside the point;
DEs have only a tangential bearing on the issues we're discussing.

As an index of how commonplace an EE problem extracting signals from
noise is, googling for it gives almost a million hits! Here's one
example drawn at random that discusses how an entire technology, spread-
spectrum transmission, depends on the ability to extract signals from
noise:

Open Spectrum: A Path to Ubiquitous Connectivity
http://acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=37


>> >> I disagree. Few have access to Tempest kit to make observations,
>> >> other than illustrations in manufacturers' brochures (which
>> >> disclose little other than the obvious).
>
>> > Few != None
>> >
>> > Some of us may well have used such equipment for years (hint, hint)
>> >
>> > See above for the trivial classification level, at least here in
>> > the UK.
>>
>>
...snip...
> For the third time of saying - the classification level is the lowest
> level possible, at least for the basics (i.e. how to build it). And
> the techniques used aren't exactly cutting-edge, either. Nor the
> materials.
>
> Have to say that I can't really understand your problem, if you've
> ever used such kit. Which may or may not be likely, based on simple
> age - it's far more common these days to shield the building and use
> off-the-shelf equipment, except for the higher-classification
> networks. Even then, a small amount of proximity control goes an awful
> long way.



I've used 'em but only briefly - but I've never been under the hood in
the sense of taking one apart (the lads there frowned on those taking
such liberties :-)

However,hubris is the vice the Greek gods punished most severely. It is
unwise to believe that a nickel's worth of math, electronics, a
tinkerer's enthusiasm, and a few parts suppliers' catalogues, can create
good emsec shielding. There's just a little more to it than that.

Any fool can apply general principles to shielding and get, perhaps, 20
dB of suppression. However, achieving 100 dB takes enormous attention to
detail. General shielding is easy (that's why any fool can get 20 dB)
but finding and closing all the leakage paths (even from, say, flexing
causing inadequate compression of RF sealing gaskets) is distinctly non-
trivial (and that's why any fool cannot get 100 dB). And building
without testing to ensure one has achieved one's objective is folly. And
testing is f**king expensive - there are relatively few certified labs
and even some Tempest builders outsource the testing rather than carry
the expense and bother!

As just one example, it is expensive and difficult to get the special
metallic-deposition-layer glass used for emsec shielding where visibility
is required (e.g., screens). The specialized manufacturers don't want to
deal in small quantities and it's awkward to ship (including lots of
paperwork if borders are crossed).

Now, none of this says emsec shielding can't be done - it IS being done
every day - has been for decades. But by *specialty* firms. If you
need the technology there's no sense jacking around trying to cobble up
these things oneself - just pony up the cash and buy one from Siemens or
Cordsen or Emcom (the ones I've used) or whomever.

But before you whip out your chequebook consider whether the not
inconsiderable sums of money could be better spent on other aspects of
your security - in almost all cases, unless you are as rich as Croesus,
you will find yourself deferring the purchase of those Tempest toys.


Moving on to your comment on proximity control, I can only presume you
have a Real Estate licence and are hoping to cash in. Increasing the
distance by a factor of 10 only gives a 20 dB drop in signal strength; a
distance factor of 100 gives 40 dB, 1000 give 60 dB, and 100,000 gives
100 dB! Most of us do not own hundreds of square miles of Nevada desert
in order to get 100 dB signal reduction through "proximity control" - it
is only a supplementary method that, in practice, might save you one
zone.

No, for a real-world discussion of emsec and some of the issues that bear
on it let me direct you to the following recent paper by one of Ross
Anderson's disciples:

Security Limits for Compromising Emanations
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ches2005-limits.pdf

Regards,



Posted by Winged on December 13, 2005, 11:36 pm
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nemo_outis wrote:
>
>
>>>>>The putative effects of interference are frequently overestimated.
>>>>>It is electronic child's play to filter interference and even,
>>>>>given the enormous redundancy in many signals, to extract
>>>>>information many decibels *below* the noise floor.
>>>>
>>>>"Child's play"? Gotta have a cite for that one.. admittedly, I'm
>>>>assuming that the box is somewhere close to the CRT and keyboard.
>>>
>>>Here's one example of a "canned solution" extracting signals from
>>>noise using FFT integration. This particular device concentrates on
>>>audio but the processes are quite general and apply to virtually all
>>>signal processing. Hell, these things are now pretty standard - they
>>>last were cutting edge when I read about them in Aviation Week in the
>>>60s!
>>>
>>>http://www.baudline.com/manual/process.html
>>
>>And hardly the same level of complexity! Being able to integrate a
>>cuboid doesn't mean that you can provide a pure solution for, say, a
>>four-way partial differential equation
>>
>>Not that I'm saying it *can't* be done, of course - after all, aren't
>>weather forecasts 100% accurate? ;o)
>
>
>
>
> An FFT is an FFT is an FFT is an FFT! (with apologies to Gertrude Stein
> :-)
>
> The technique is *very broadly applicable* to extracting signals that
> contain redundancy from below the noise floor in *many* areas of signal
> processing. It is one of a family of time & frequency domain transform
> techniques widely used in DSP. See, for instance, a discussion of their
> application with emphasis on radar in:
>
> Time-frequency Transforms for Radar Imaging and Signal Analysis
> http://www.scitechpub.com/Chen_Time_Freq.htm
>
> As for partial differential equations, all of E&M reduces to Maxwell's 4
> differential equations. And I've solved a few cases of them (trivial
> cases just for waveguides). Instead, my differential equation solving
> usually deals with the nastier Navier-Stokes differential equations
> applicable to fluid dynamics. But, really, all this is beside the point;
> DEs have only a tangential bearing on the issues we're discussing.
>
> As an index of how commonplace an EE problem extracting signals from
> noise is, googling for it gives almost a million hits! Here's one
> example drawn at random that discusses how an entire technology, spread-
> spectrum transmission, depends on the ability to extract signals from
> noise:
>
> Open Spectrum: A Path to Ubiquitous Connectivity
> http://acmqueue.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=37
>
>
>
>>>>>I disagree. Few have access to Tempest kit to make observations,
>>>>>other than illustrations in manufacturers' brochures (which
>>>>>disclose little other than the obvious).
>>
>>>>Few != None
>>>>
>>>>Some of us may well have used such equipment for years (hint, hint)
>>>>
>>>>See above for the trivial classification level, at least here in
>>>>the UK.
>>>
>>>
> ....snip...
>
>>For the third time of saying - the classification level is the lowest
>>level possible, at least for the basics (i.e. how to build it). And
>>the techniques used aren't exactly cutting-edge, either. Nor the
>>materials.
>>
>>Have to say that I can't really understand your problem, if you've
>>ever used such kit. Which may or may not be likely, based on simple
>>age - it's far more common these days to shield the building and use
>>off-the-shelf equipment, except for the higher-classification
>>networks. Even then, a small amount of proximity control goes an awful
>>long way.
>
>
>
>
> I've used 'em but only briefly - but I've never been under the hood in
> the sense of taking one apart (the lads there frowned on those taking
> such liberties :-)
>
> However,hubris is the vice the Greek gods punished most severely. It is
> unwise to believe that a nickel's worth of math, electronics, a
> tinkerer's enthusiasm, and a few parts suppliers' catalogues, can create
> good emsec shielding. There's just a little more to it than that.
>
> Any fool can apply general principles to shielding and get, perhaps, 20
> dB of suppression. However, achieving 100 dB takes enormous attention to
> detail. General shielding is easy (that's why any fool can get 20 dB)
> but finding and closing all the leakage paths (even from, say, flexing
> causing inadequate compression of RF sealing gaskets) is distinctly non-
> trivial (and that's why any fool cannot get 100 dB). And building
> without testing to ensure one has achieved one's objective is folly. And
> testing is f**king expensive - there are relatively few certified labs
> and even some Tempest builders outsource the testing rather than carry
> the expense and bother!
>
> As just one example, it is expensive and difficult to get the special
> metallic-deposition-layer glass used for emsec shielding where visibility
> is required (e.g., screens). The specialized manufacturers don't want to
> deal in small quantities and it's awkward to ship (including lots of
> paperwork if borders are crossed).
>
> Now, none of this says emsec shielding can't be done - it IS being done
> every day - has been for decades. But by *specialty* firms. If you
> need the technology there's no sense jacking around trying to cobble up
> these things oneself - just pony up the cash and buy one from Siemens or
> Cordsen or Emcom (the ones I've used) or whomever.
>
> But before you whip out your chequebook consider whether the not
> inconsiderable sums of money could be better spent on other aspects of
> your security - in almost all cases, unless you are as rich as Croesus,
> you will find yourself deferring the purchase of those Tempest toys.
>
>
> Moving on to your comment on proximity control, I can only presume you
> have a Real Estate licence and are hoping to cash in. Increasing the
> distance by a factor of 10 only gives a 20 dB drop in signal strength; a
> distance factor of 100 gives 40 dB, 1000 give 60 dB, and 100,000 gives
> 100 dB! Most of us do not own hundreds of square miles of Nevada desert
> in order to get 100 dB signal reduction through "proximity control" - it
> is only a supplementary method that, in practice, might save you one
> zone.
>
> No, for a real-world discussion of emsec and some of the issues that bear
> on it let me direct you to the following recent paper by one of Ross
> Anderson's disciples:
>
> Security Limits for Compromising Emanations
> www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ches2005-limits.pdf
>
> Regards,
>
>

I gotta live more dangerous n get me a secret....I have been in Venus
rooms..not much fun and always stuffy, in several ways... If one wants
tempest buy it. If your laying out the cash for the equipment, room
mods etc, you should not neglect the security system and trusted guys
(always must be more than one) with guns who are anxious to shoot
someone and like no one. The room mods and the appropriate crypto gear
to secure the data and transmit it securely to some other equally secure
environment. Of course perimeter zoning must be controlled even with
tempest (tempest only addresses one of many security issues).

After one has invested these funds you have to wonder if paper and
pencil might not have been a better solution...

I just gotta get me a secret

As to waveguides and magnatrons, the PFM factor is sufficient for me, it
makes my head hurt..I have a difficult enough time figuring what
process is calling a specific generic dll and exactly what the process
is doing.

There are a couple graphic files floating around the net at the moment
that are quite remarkable in their activity...that actually also display
a graphic. I already know there are bright bulbs out there... I am not
convinced that the graphic decompression engine problem is totally fixed
even with the latest MS patch.

Winged

Posted by nemo_outis on December 14, 2005, 12:07 pm
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options


>
> I gotta live more dangerous n get me a secret....


It's a dull man who doesn't have something worth hiding :-)


> ...If one wants tempest buy it.


Yes, indeedy - this is one of my main points to HOK. I don't construct
my own hard-disks either :-)


> If your laying out the cash for the equipment,
> room mods etc, you should not neglect the security system and trusted
> guys (always must be more than one) with guns who are anxious to shoot
> someone and like no one. The room mods and the appropriate crypto gear
> to secure the data and transmit it securely to some other equally
> secure environment. Of course perimeter zoning must be controlled
> even with tempest (tempest only addresses one of many security
> issues).
>
> After one has invested these funds you have to wonder if paper and
> pencil might not have been a better solution...


Ross Anderson (yeah, I'm a fan) remarks on how very few Tempest civil-
sector security breaches there have been in the twenty years or so since
van Eck's original paper. Now maybe the eavesdroppers are super slick,
or maybe the victims are reluctant to go public, but I suspect a third
explanation is far more likely: Tempest attacks are bloody rare! In
which case, one's security budget is better spent elsewhere. In any case
it leads me to believe one should read with a critical eye any risk and
threat analysis that does attach a high profile to emsec threats


> I just gotta get me a secret


If it's any help I can send you a list of people I'd like to have killed
:-)


> As to waveguides and magnatrons, the PFM factor is sufficient for me,
> it makes my head hurt..I have a difficult enough time figuring what
> process is calling a specific generic dll and exactly what the process
> is doing.
>
> There are a couple graphic files floating around the net at the moment
> that are quite remarkable in their activity...that actually also
> display a graphic. I already know there are bright bulbs out there...
> I am not convinced that the graphic decompression engine problem is
> totally fixed even with the latest MS patch.
>
> Winged
>


Regards,



Posted by Hairy One Kenobi on December 14, 2005, 3:42 am
If you were  Registered and logged in, you could reply and use other advanced thread options
>
> >> >> The putative effects of interference are frequently overestimated.
> >> >> It is electronic child's play to filter interference and even,
> >> >> given the enormous redundancy in many signals, to extract
> >> >> information many decibels *below* the noise floor.
> >> >
> >> > "Child's play"? Gotta have a cite for that one.. admittedly, I'm
> >> > assuming that the box is somewhere close to the CRT and keyboard.

<much snippage>

> > And hardly the same level of complexity! Being able to integrate a
> > cuboid doesn't mean that you can provide a pure solution for, say, a
> > four-way partial differential equation
> >
> > Not that I'm saying it *can't* be done, of course - after all, aren't
> > weather forecasts 100% accurate? ;o)

> Instead, my differential equation solving
> usually deals with the nastier Navier-Stokes differential equations
> applicable to fluid dynamics. But, really, all this is beside the point;
> DEs have only a tangential bearing on the issues we're discussing.

If I hadn't covered them 20+ years ago in my first year of college, I'd
probably be very impressed with that statement ;o)

What can be neatly solved is used as examples, what can't (i.e. anything
other than special cases) takes either a helluva lot of computing power,
some dodgy graphs, or a bit of work with a La Place table. My Top Tip for
that one is "try not to be taught by the world expert in Nyquist plots" - La
Place saves hours of work, but (obviously) is only ever applicable on an
individual basis.

Oh, and if you think /that's/ hard, then just wait for the second year and
the stress analysis of statically-indeterminate structures..

> > Have to say that I can't really understand your problem, if you've
> > ever used such kit. Which may or may not be likely, based on simple
> > age - it's far more common these days to shield the building and use
> > off-the-shelf equipment, except for the higher-classification
> > networks. Even then, a small amount of proximity control goes an awful
> > long way.
>
> I've used 'em but only briefly - but I've never been under the hood in
> the sense of taking one apart (the lads there frowned on those taking
> such liberties :-)
>
> However,hubris is the vice the Greek gods punished most severely. It is
> unwise to believe that a nickel's worth of math, electronics, a
> tinkerer's enthusiasm, and a few parts suppliers' catalogues, can create
> good emsec shielding. There's just a little more to it than that.

You'd be surprised.. after all, what's actually inside the box is the same
as the semi-shielded version (I say "semi", because EM shielding has been a
requirement for a not inconsiderable time). All that's changed is the degree
of shielding, and materials technology is roughly constant throughout th
universe.

>And
> testing is f**king expensive - there are relatively few certified labs
> and even some Tempest builders outsource the testing rather than carry
> the expense and bother!

Hmm. Hadn't heard of anyone that /didn't/ outsource - and I can't imagine
that the DoD is /that/ more lax than the UK MoD in demanding independant
figures?

> As just one example, it is expensive and difficult to get the special
> metallic-deposition-layer glass used for emsec shielding where visibility
> is required (e.g., screens). The specialized manufacturers don't want to
> deal in small quantities and it's awkward to ship (including lots of
> paperwork if borders are crossed).
>
> Now, none of this says emsec shielding can't be done - it IS being done
> every day - has been for decades. But by *specialty* firms. If you
> need the technology there's no sense jacking around trying to cobble up
> these things oneself - just pony up the cash and buy one from Siemens or
> Cordsen or Emcom (the ones I've used) or whomever.
>
> But before you whip out your chequebook consider whether the not
> inconsiderable sums of money could be better spent on other aspects of
> your security - in almost all cases, unless you are as rich as Croesus,
> you will find yourself deferring the purchase of those Tempest toys.

I'm not entirely sure who you're arguing with at this point. After all, I've
already pointed out that it's been the general rule to shield buildings and
particlar enclosures, rather than buy specialised expensive kit. Maybe I
should have put a timeframe in there? How about "two decades" (true for the
UK, no idea about the US).

> Moving on to your comment on proximity control, I can only presume you
> have a Real Estate licence and are hoping to cash in. Increasing the
> distance by a factor of 10 only gives a 20 dB drop in signal strength; a
> distance factor of 100 gives 40 dB, 1000 give 60 dB, and 100,000 gives
> 100 dB! Most of us do not own hundreds of square miles of Nevada desert
> in order to get 100 dB signal reduction through "proximity control" - it
> is only a supplementary method that, in practice, might save you one
> zone.

Forgive me for saying, but that sounds like some reading from a set of
tables, rather than doing any calculations. You *do* know that dB is an
exponential unit, rather than linear? That each 3dB indicates a /halving/ in
signal level?

Measure your signal drop-off by taking your distance and applying the
inverse-square rule (as defined by Newton in the seventeenth century), then
take the base-10 logarithm and multiply by -10. Simple.

And, of course, largely irrelevant in the electronic Real World (which tends
to have variable permittivity, most of us not living in a complete vacuum
and all ;o)

Or is someone about to argue that taking a signal below
instrument-detectable levels and then dropping it by another order of
magnitude is somehow useful?

Remember, with a simple 400m distance (not a magic number - just thinking of
a particular building) you're talking a 52dB attenuation (assuming that
pesky vacuum) - i.e. you're signal has dropped to 0.000625% of what you were
previously looking at. If you also assume that no establishment with guards
that aren't utterly brain-dead will let you lurk within 100m of the wire
with a suitcaseful of dodgy electronics, then that drops still further, to 4
tenths of a thousandth of a percent.

H1K

P.S. Almost forgot - if you're not willing to order leaded glass from
someone like Pilkington, then it's perfectly possible to buy self-adhesive
gold film off-the-shelf and make you're own, as in the A6 Queer (apologies
to anyone of that disposition - can't remember the official aircraft
designation!)



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